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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this appeal by
virtue of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 2 6 of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure

(See Appendix A) ; and 78-2a-

3(2) (d) , Utah Code Annotated, 1953, (as amended) . See Appendix A.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
The following is a list of those constitutional provisions,
statutes and rules thought to be determinative. A complete text of
each provision is found in Appendix A.
Section 76-6-602(1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
Section 76-6-603, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
Section 78-2a-3(2)(d), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.

FACTS
The defendant

in this matter was tried by the bench and

convicted of retail theft on March 10, 1992. Defendants conviction
stemmed

from

an

incident

where

the

defendant

took

two

video

cassette tapes in a single package from the K-mart store located at
475 North State Street in Orem.
At the trial, the City of Orem was represented by Donald E.
McCandless, and the defendant was represented by Randy Lish.

The

City first called Wendy Callahan, the Loss Prevention Manager for
the K-Mart store in Orem.

Ms. Callahan testified to the following:

Ms. Callahan first observed the defendant on December 23, 1992,
from an observation window above the appliance and tape section of
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statement was illegible, though it appeared to say "put tapes in
bag."

At that point, Mr. Lee stood up and stated, "you told me I

could go if I did this."

Ms. Callahan said "No I did not."

need to do this and then we'll talk."
statement
officers
testified

from
were
that

across
called.

the

table

During

it would be

and

cross

"We

Mr. Lee then grabbed his
crinkled

it up.

examination

Police

Ms. Callahan

impossible to determine

whether a

particular tape had been stolen from an inventory list.

R. at 19.

On Cross examination Mr. Lee admitted that he placed the tapes in
the sack. R. at 28.

Ms. Callahan testified that based on her

experience, if she were going to attempt to shoplift, she would do
it the same way Mr. Lee has been convicted of doing.

She indicates

that the technique is called "buy one get one free."

Shoplifters

using this technique are difficult to apprehend because there is
luck involved in seeing a person come into a section with nothing,
seeing them select an item and identifying that item, and watching
them take the item into their possession. R. at 10-11.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellee City of Orem asserts that Judge Dimick properly found
the defendant guilty in this matter. Every element of retail theft
was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Defendant erroneously asserts that to prove the elements of
retail theft the City must prove that a specific item is missing
from inventory.

Such evidence is neither available nor necessary.

The evidence at trial was that K-Mart does not have the capability
to determine whether a particular item is missing.
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to the trier of fact to support the verdict.

After considering

what evidence has been marshalled, the appellate court must:
view all the evidence and inferences that may reasonably
be drawn from it in a light most favorable to the jury
verdict, and [the] verdict will be reversed only if
evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that defendant committed the crime of
which he was convicted, State v. Caver, 814 P.2d 604,
612 (Utah App. 1991).
As indicated in appellant's brief this standard has been widely
applied. State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201 (Utah App. 1991); State v.
Moore, 802 P.2d 732 (Utah App. 1990); State v. Pederson, 802 P.2d
1328, 1330 (Utah App. 1990); State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147
(Utah 1989); State v. Bolsinqer, 699 P.2d 1214, 1218 (Utah 1985).
State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474-476, (Utah 1990) .
B.

The

evidence

presented

at

trial

by

Appellee

clearly

establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The
appellant

marshalling

requirement

set

forth

above

necessitates

setting forth the evidence in favor of the verdict.

Appellant has failed to do that, and has left the court in much the
same position as described in State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470-473
(Utah App. 1991) .
Defendant's brief is devoid of any mention of the
evidence supporting the jury verdict.
Rather, it
attempts to reargue defendant's case by recounting a
version of the facts most favorable to defendant while
ignoring lengthy expert testimony concerning the origin
of the fire and explaining why defendant's story is not
feasible,.
Thus while "emphasizing the evidence that
supported his position," defendant has "left it to the
court to sort out what evidence actually supported the
findings." Quoting Heineke v. Dept of Commerce 810 P.2d
459, 464 (Utah App. 1991).
5

Appellant appears to have left out of his marshalling of the
evidence references to critical facts which support the verdict.
1. Mr. Lee was first observed in the blank tape aisle
from an observation window.

He was wearing a coat and had

nothing in his hands. R. at 3.
2. Mr. Lee went directly to the camcorder tapes and
selected a package containing two tapes.

R. at 3.

3. Mr. Lee left the tape aisle and traveled down the
first home improvement aisle still carrying the tapes.

He

entered the next home improvement aisle carrying the tapes,
then stopped momentarily
the bottom shelf.

while selecting a caulking gun from

When Mr. Lee left that aisle he was

carrying the caulking gun, and the tapes which had apparently
been placed inside a crinkled K-Mart bag.

R. at 4.

4. Mr. Lee did not have the bag in his hands when he
entered that aisle. The bag into which the tapes were placed
was not new. R. at 4.

Mr. Lee admitted that he brought the

bag into the store with him, and that he put tapes into a bag.
R. at 24 and 28. Also at 22.
5. Mr. Lee testified that he was in the store to return
tapes.

R. at 22, 24, 25.

Despite his claim that he was in

the store to return tapes, he was observed in the tape aisle
where he selected a package of tapes which were in his
possession when he left the aisle. R. at 3 and 4.
6. Store security searched the areas of the store where
Mr. Lee had been seen and did not find any other tapes. R. at
6

17.
7. Mr. Lee went to the front of the store where he paid
for the caulking gun., He was stopped shortly thereafter. R.
at 5 .
8. After being stopped, Mr. Lee produced a receipt from
the previous day which had 8mm tapes on it. R. at 5.
9. After showing the receipt, Mr. Lee became agitated.
Store security had to call for help to prevent him from
leaving the store.

Mr. Lee kept shoving at the security

officer while trying to leave.
10.

R. at 5-6.

In the security office Mr. Lee wrote a statement

which appeared to say "put tapes in bag"
statement.
11.

then crinkled the

R. at 19.

Ms. Callahan testified that based on her experience

as a loss pretention manager, if she were going to shoplift
she would do it the same way Mr. Lee has been convicted of
doing. She testified that the technique is called buy one get
one free.

Shoplifters using this technique* are difficult to

apprehend because luck is involved in seeing a person come
into a section with nothing, watching them select an item,
identifying the item and watching them take the item into
their possession.

R. at 10-11.

There is more than an adequate factual basis set forth in the
facts marshalled above to support the verdict of Judge Dimick
convicting the defendant. The elements of this crime are set forth
in Utah Code Annotated section 76-6-602(1) (1953, as amended) . The
7

elements are set forth as follows:
A person commits the offense of retail theft when he
knowingly: (1) Takes possession of, conceals, carries
away, transfers or causes to be carried away or
transferred, any merchandise displayed, held, stored or
offered for sale in a retail mercantile establishment
with the intention of retaining such merchandise or with
the intention of depriving the merchant permanently of
the possession, use or benefit of such merchandise
without paying the retail value of such merchandise.
The evidence clearly establishes that Mr. Lee took possession of
merchandise belonging to K-Mart, that he concealed the merchandise,
that he attempted to carry it away, and that he did so without
paying the retail value of the merchandise.

His intent in this

matter can clearly be inferred from his actions.
C.

It is not necessary to prove that the tapes in question

were missing from inventory.
Appellant argues for an impossible requirement in requesting
that Appellee produce inventory lists showing that a particular
item is missing from inventory.
is

impossible

to

determine

The evidence at trial was that it
from

particular item has been stolen.

inventory

lists

whether

a

R. at 19. Appellant's argument

in reality goes to the sufficiency of the evidence, and the
credibility of witnesses. Evidence was presented that Mr. Lee was
seen picking up the tapes in question from the tape aisle in KMart.

R. at 3.

Mr. Lee testified that he did not take the tapes

from the shelf. R. at 26. It is clear that the Court has chosen to
believe Ms. Callahan's testimony rather than that of Mr. Lee.
There is adequate evidence in the record for the court to find that
the tapes were taken from K-Mart.
8

II.

NO INTERPRETER WAS NECESSARY BECAUSE APPELLANT HAS AN ADEQUATE

UNDERSTANDING OF ENGLISH.
The claimed need for an interpreter in this matter has first
been

raised

on

appeal.

Appellant

attempts

to

remedy

deficiency by claiming that trial counsel was incompetent.

that
The

part of this claim that deals with competency of counsel will be
dealt with later in this brief.
The issue of an interpreter was not dealt with at the time of
trial because neither of the parties, nor the court perceived any
need for an interpreter.

The defendant in this matter has lived in

the United States for an extended period of time.
engineer, and is studying for a doctorate.

He works as an

Both at work, and in

school, the defendant functions using the English language.

The

defendant certainly has an accent, but at the time of trial neither
the court nor the attorneys had any difficulty communicating with
the

defendant.

The

answers

defendant

made

to

counsel

were

responsive, and though his English is somewhat broken, it is clear
from the record that neither the court nor counsel had difficulty
understanding the defendant, his testimony, or his theory of the
case.

Admittedly there are a few places in the record where the

reporter had a difficult time understanding the defendant, and
marked the record "unintelligible."

These areas have two sources.

The first of these comes from the difficulties which naturally
arise when a record must be made from a tape recording by a person
who was not present at trial.

The second source of difficulty

arises because Mr. Lee appeared to have breathing difficulties at
9

trial which caused him to cough and wheeze a number of times. The
fact that these problems made a less than perfect record does not
automatically mean that the defendant did not understand the judge,
and the judge the defendant.

Review of the record makes it clear

from the context of the conversations that the parties had little
trouble communicating.

It is incredible to assume that a Judge

would convict the defendant without being able to understand his
testimony.
The Court of Appeals in the State of Washington dealt with a
situation similar to the case at bar in State v. Mendez 784 P.2d
168 (Wash. App. 1989) .

In that case the court was considering

whether to allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea. One of the
issues

on

appeal was whether the defendant

had

an adequate

understanding of English to allow him to enter his plea knowingly.
Like the defendant in the case at bar, Mr. Mendez had lived in the
United

States

for

an

extended

period

understanding of the English language.
apparent

of

time,

and

had

an

In that case it was

from the record that the defendant had an adequate

understanding of the English language to allow him to understand
the nature of his actions in court.

The Court stated:

We see nothing, however, in either the rule or the
statute that imposes on the trial court the affirmative
obligation to appoint an interpreter for a defendant
where that defendant's lack of fluency or facility in the
language is not apparent.
The appointment of an
interpreter is within the discretion of the trial court
and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of
abuse.
There can be no showing of abuse of discretion in the case at bar
because it was not apparent to either counsel, or the Court that
10

Mr.

Lee

did

not

have

an

adequate

understanding

of

English.

Further, Mr. Lee has not shown that the lack of an interpreter has
hampered

the presentation

difficulties

he

may

have

of his case.
had

at

Despite

trial,

Mr.

presented, and he took the stand and testified.

any

Lee's

language
case

was

At no time did a

difficulty with language impede the trial or prevent Mr. Lee from
presenting his theory of the case. This Court has stated, "Failure
to appoint an interpreter, however, is reversible error only when
the record shows that the defendant's presentation of the case has
been thereby hampered."

State v. Drobel 815 P.2d 724, 737 (Utah

App. 1991), State v. Vasguez, 121 P.-2d 903, 906 (1942).

III. DEFENDANT WAS ADEQUATELY REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL
Mr. Lee's contentions with regard to counsel are essentially
twofold.

The first argument seems to indicate that Mr. Lee was not

adequately

represented because he did not have an

appointed, and none was appointed by the Court.

interpreter

This argument is

simply another attempt to have this court consider the interpreter
issue which has been discussed previously.

No interpreter was

necessary because the defendant speaks and understands the English
language.
The second contention seems to be that Mr. Lee's trial counsel
was

incompetent

because

of

the

trial

strategy

he

adopted.

Defendant's brief sets forth the proper standard for considering a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, which is the standard
set forth in Strickland v. Washington
11

466 U.S. 668,687, Reh'h

denied, 467 U.S. 1267 (1984).

This case sets forth a two pronged

test. The first prong essentially is showing that trial counsel's
performance was deficient by showing errors so serious that counsel
was not functioning as counsel. The second prong requires that the
defendant

show that the deficient performance prejudiced the

defendant.

This requires a showing that the claimed errors of

counsel were so serious as to deprive defendant of a fair trial.
Mr. Lee has not met either prong of the test.
The first issue raised by Defendant is that there was no
challenge to the detention of Mr. Lee by store personnel.

The

reason there was no challenge to this detention is that there was
nothing improper about the way the detention was handled. Mr. Lish
had conducted discovery and knew this.

Mr. Lee was extremely

agitated at the time he was detained by store personnel, and only
the necessary force to control the situation was used. R. at 6, 14,
15. Utah's retail theft provisions allow detention of persons such
as Mr. Lee.

Utah Code Annotated 76-6-603 (1953 as amended).

Mr.

Lee while trying to intimate that there might be something improper
about his detention, has failed to provide the court with any
information that there actually was a problem with either the
length or manner of his detention. Defendant seems to lean heavily
on the fact that he was asked to prepare a written statement while
he was detained.
the City.

This statement was not offered into evidence by

The only part of the statement which was used was

testimony that store personnel thought the statement said "put
tapes

in bag."

This

statement
12

is not harmful

as

it fits

defendant's theory of the case perfectly, as it is his contention
that he had a package of tapes which belonged to him, and he put
them

in a bag to avoid problems

with personnel

at the

store

thinking he had stolen them.
On appeal Mr,. Lee contends that representation by counsel was
inadequate because no objection was made on the basis of foundation
to introduction of the tapes. The tapes were offered into evidence
during cross examination
convenience.

of the first witness

as a matter

of

The problem with Mr. Lee's position on appeal is that

there would be no reason to object to the introduction of the
tapes.

Mr. Lee's theory of the case was that these were his tapes

which he purchased the day before.

Introduction of the tapes into

evidence is as critical to the presentation of Mr. Lee's case as it
was for the City.

Allowing the tapes into evidence with minimal

foundation was certainly not proof that counsel was not acting
properly.

Defendant needed the tapes admitted to help test his

theory of the case.
The same argument holds true with regard to the statement "put
tapes in bag."

Defendant's theory was that he was putting the

tapes he had previously purchased in his bag.

There was likely not

an objection available which could have prevented the statement
from coming into evidence even if there had been a reason for
counsel to object to it.
Mr. Lee contends that critical evidence was not offered which
would provide a defense to Mr. Lee. The item specifically referred
to was the receipt which showed that defendant purchased some tapes
13

the day prior.

While it is true that the actual receipt was not

offered, there was extensive testimony regarding the receipt and
its contents, to which there was no objection.

It was unrefuted at

trial that Mr. Lee produced a receipt from the day before the crime
which showed he had purchased tapes.

Offering the actual receipt

at trial would not add any additional weight to that unrefuted
testimony.

There was therefore no error by counsel. The fact that

Defendant had the receipt was not disputed, but was basically
stipulated to.
As has been demonstrated, the errors Mr. Lee claims were made
by counsel at trial were in fact part of Mr. Lish's trial strategy,
and

cannot

Furthermore,

be

construed

Mr.

Lee

has

as
not

ineffectiveness
shown

how

the

alleged

omissions of counsel have prejudiced his defense.
Montes, 804 P.2d 543, 546 (Utah App. 1991).
a claim of ineffective counsel cannot stand.

by

counsel.
acts

or

See State v.

Without such showing,
This court in State

v. Montes with respect to Mr. Montes claim that his counsel's
performance was deficient stated "Montes can only prevail if he
demonstrates that he was prejudiced as a result of that deficient
performance.

The mere fact that Montes received an unfavorable

result does not give rise to the conclusion that his trial counsel
was deficient."

State v. Montes, 804 P.2d 543, 546,547 (Utah App.

1991), State v. Grueber, 776 P.2d 70, 76 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Because there are tactical and strategic justifications for
Counsel's actions in this case, the claim of ineffectiveness of
counsel cannot stand.
14

Generally, an attorney's performance will be held
ineffective only when there is no tactical, or strategic
justification for his conduct of the trial. Thus, when
counsel has failed to take a particular action, a court
must determine whether such failure was justified by
tactical or other considerations. State v. Colona, 766
P.2d 1062, 1066 (Utah 1988).
State v. Buel, 700 P.2d
701, 703 (Utah 1985); Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d at
1109.
CONCLUSION
Review of the evidence as marshalled by the Appellee City of
Orem clearly provides sufficient facts to have allowed the Court to
find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Lee is guilty of retail
theft.
Mr. Lee's claim that he was denied a fair trial because he was
not provided an interpreter is not well taken because he speaks and
understands English, and because the issue has never been raised
prior to the appeal.
The

claim

that

counsel

was

incompetent

is

based

on

inconsequential matters, and items that are part of the strategy
used by counsel at trial. Because Mr. Lee has not demonstrated any
reasons for reversal and remand, his conviction for retail theft
should stand.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

Z^V^

day of August, 1992.

7 .
Donald E. McCan^l^/ss
Attorney for Appellee
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APPENDIX A
Utah Code Annotated
(in applicable parts)
Section 76-6-602(1)
A person
knowingly:

commits

the

offense

of

retail

theft

when

he

Takes possession of, conceals, carries away, or transfers or
causes to be carried away or transferred, any merchandise
displayed, held, stored, or offered for sale in a retail
mercantile establishment with the intention of retaining such
merchandise or with the intention of depriving the merchant
permanently of the possession, use or benefit of such
merchandise without paying the retail value of such
merchandise.
Section 76-6-603
Any merchant who has probable cause to believe that a person
has committed retail theft may detain such person, on or off the
premises of a retail mercantile establishment, in a reasonable
manner and for a reasonable length of time for all or any of the
following purposes:
(1) To make reasonable inquiry as to whether such person has
in his possession unpurchased merchandise and to make
reasonable investigation of the ownership of such merchandise;
(2) To request identification;
(3) To verify such identification;
(4) To make a reasonable request of such person to place or
keep in full view any merchandise such individual may have
removed, or which the merchant has reason to believe he may
have removed, from its place of display or elsewhere, whether
for examination, purchase or for any other reasonable purpose;
(5) To inform a peace officer of the detention of the person
and surrender that person to the custody of a peace officer;
(6)
In the case of a minor, to inform a peace officer, the
parents, guardian or other private person interested in the
welfare of that minor immediately, if possible, of this
detention and to surrender custody of such minor to such
person.
A merchant may make a detention as permitted herein off the
premises of a retail mercantile establishment
only if such
detention is pursuant to an immediate pursuit of such person.

Al

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
(in applicable parts)
Section 78-2a-3(2)(d)
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from
the small claims department of a circuit court;
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